In a two-stage game where followers can observe moves by leaders only with noise, pure subgame perfect Nash equilibria of the limiting game without noise may not survive arbitrarily small noise. Still, for almost all games, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game with no noise that is approximated by equilibrium outcomes of games with small noise. This, however, depends crucially on generic payoffs and does not necessarily hold for all subgame perfect equilibria of the game without noise. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.
INTRODUCTION
In a recent paper Bagwell (1995) has challenged the validity of applying backwards induction to perfect information two-stage games. Consider any (finite) two-player game with generic payoffs, where one player, the "leader," moves first, and then, after having observed a noisy signal about the leader's choice, the "follower" moves. Bagwell shows that in such games the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes coincide with those of the associated "one-shot" game in which both players move simultaneously. This has been interpreted as showing that any precommitment effect is eliminated when there is a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the leader's choice. 1 But subsequent analysis by van Damme and Hurkens (1997) indicates that it is the focus on pure strategy equilibria which seems to eliminate the precommitment effect. Call an outcome accessible if it is induced by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game with perfect observability and every game with sufficiently small noise in the observations has a (possibly mixed) equilibrium inducing an outcome close to the accessible one. Van Damme and Hurkens show that for any generic two-player game the (unique) subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of the game without noise is accessible. They also show that the approximating mixed equilibria in the games with noise get selected by an equilibrium selection theory in the spirit of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) .
The analysis conducted so far is restricted to two-player games with generic payoffs. Therefore, the issue arises whether the results depend on these restrictions. The present paper addresses this in a general setup of n-player games with arbitrary payoffs. Any such "one-shot" game can be transformed into an extensive form game by splitting the player set into two non-empty subsets, the "leaders" and the "followers," such that leaders move first, followers observe a possibly noisy signal about the leaders' strategy combination, and finally make their choices simultaneously. Therefore, in this framework even the game with perfect observability may have several subgame perfect equilibria. Payoffs need not necessarily be generic, so extensive forms underlying each of the two interactions among leaders and among followers, respectively, are allowed for. 2 We show that in this general setup only one part of Bagwell's (1995) observation continues to hold. In particular, equilibrium outcomes of the "one-shot" game in which leaders play pure remain as equilibrium out-1 Such an interpretation, of course, depends on the validity of noise in the signals that the follower receives. Consider, for instance, a monopolist setting a price for a number of objects which consumers may buy at the quoted price. If there is noise in the observations of the price, then some consumers may find themselves accepting a bargain that the monopolist has never offered. So, whether or not the introduction of noise into the observations of the leader's choice is a valid procedure, depends on the situation which is modeled.
2 What is not allowed for is that one player moves at both stages, i.e., one of the leaders and one of the followers are agents of the same original player. Under the informational assumptions of the present model this would violate perfect recall.
comes in the games with noisy signals. But the converse is not necessarily true. Equilibria of the games with imperfect observability at which leaders play pure need not always induce equilibrium outcomes of the "one-shot" game. The result by van Damme and Hurkens (1997) , on the other hand, holds true for all games with generic payoffs. For any partition of the player set into leaders and followers and for almost all "one-shot" games there exists an accessible outcome.
By means of examples we also show that these results are binding in the following sense: For degenerate payoffs there exist two-player games which have no accessible outcome at all. Moreover, there are games with degenerate payoffs and with more than two players for which even a set-valued generalization of accessibility fails to exist. Finally, games with several followers and with generic payoffs may have subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes which are not accessible.
The existence of an accessible outcome for almost all games is driven by the presence of a Nash equilibrium outcome which is robust against all payoff perturbations. Such robustness is a stronger criterion than strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986 ) which requires only robustness against strategy perturbations. But the latter may not span the payoffs generated by noisy signals.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains notation and the description of the model. Section 3 explores the survival of "one-shot" equilibrium outcomes when signals are noisy and leaders play pure strategies. Section 4 demonstrates the existence of accessible outcomes for almost all games and contains the negative examples described above. Section 5 concludes.
THE MODEL

Let
= S i i∈N u i i∈N be a finite normal form game with players i ∈ N = 1 n , (finite) pure strategy sets S i , S = ؋ i∈N S i , and payoff functions u i S → . Mixed strategy sets are denoted by S i , the space of mixed strategy combinations by S = ؋ i∈N S i , and payoff functions for the mixed extension U i S → are defined as usual, ∀ i ∈ N. The game will be referred to as the one-shot game. Now partition the player set N into two non-empty sets, the set of "leaders" I and the set of "followers" II, denote S I = ؋ i∈I S i and S II = ؋ i∈II S i , and define the extensive form game G as follows: First all players i ∈ I choose simultaneously their pure strategies s i ∈ S i . Then all players i ∈ II get to see s I ∈ S I and choose simultaneously their pure strategies s i ∈ S i , ∀ i ∈ II. Payoffs at terminal nodes are as in . The normal form game that corresponds to G is denoted by G .
Next, introduce (possibly) noisy signals about the leaders' strategy combination. For each follower i ∈ II let T i be a set of signals with the same number of elements as S I , T i = S I , ∀ i ∈ II. Denote by T the product T = ؋ i∈II T i and let be the set of all conditional probability distributions λ = λ t s t s ∈T ×S I over vectors of signals of followers given a strategy combination of leaders. The set will be the parameter set for the games defined below. Associated with any λ ∈ there is an extensive form game G λ defined as follows: First leaders i ∈ I choose simultaneously their strategies s i ∈ S i , ∀ i ∈ I. Then, given s I ∈ S I , a chance move selects a vector of signals t ∈ T according to the probability distribution λ t s I , ∀ t ∈ T . Finally, each follower i ∈ II gets to see her signal t i ∈ T i and chooses, simultaneously with other followers, her strategy s i ∈ S i , ∀ i ∈ II, in response to her signal. Payoffs V λ i in G λ are derived from the payoffs of the one-shot game. i i∈II ∈ S II . Given some vector of signals t = t i i∈II ∈ T a behavior strategy combination of followers b = b i i∈II = b i τ i τ i ∈T i i∈II evaluated at the signal vector, b t = b i t i i∈II = b i s i t i s i ∈S i i∈II , induces a probability distribution on S II by b s
A typical (behavior) strategy combination for all players will be denoted by σ = σ I b ∈ , where is the space of all behavior strategy combinations. With these definitions the payoff function for player i ∈ N in G λ is given by To define outcomes induced by strategy combinations, let S be the set of probability distributions on S and define φ S → S by
which gives the outcome induced by σ ∈ S in the one-shot game . For each λ ∈ the function φ λ → S defined by
gives the outcome induced by σ ∈ and λ ∈ in the game G λ . The inverse of φ from Eq. (2) gives the marginals corresponding to an outcome by
where
Finally, let us distinguish the following classes of signal distributions. First, define int as the set of all λ ∈ such that for each follower i ∈ II one has λ i t i s
where T −i = ؋ j∈II\ i T j . Signals are noisy if λ ∈ int , i.e., if for each follower every signal always occurs with positive probability. Second, let m λ s = arg max t∈T λ t s denote the most likely vector of signals given s ∈ S I and call the signals perfectly informative if λ m λ s s = 1, ∀ s ∈ S I , and for each follower m λ projects one-to-one onto the signal space T i . When signals are perfectly informative, every follower can deduce with certainty from her signal both the leaders' strategy combination and the signals of all other followers, because signals are perfectly correlated.
Third, call the signals completely uninformative if for each i ∈ II there is a probability distributionλ i T i → + , such that λ t s = i∈IIλi t i , ∀ t = t i i∈II ∈ T , ∀ s ∈ S I . When signals are completely uninformative, the distribution of signals is independent of the leaders' strategy combination and signals are uncorrelated across followers.
Since Remark. The present model can be modified to accomodate a more explicit treatment of extensive form interaction among leaders. If leaders interact according to a fixed tree several strategy combinations s I ∈ S I may lead to the same outcome (of the interaction among leaders) and followers may only receive signals about those outcomes, rather than about the full strategy combination of leaders. The required modification for such cases may be sketched as follows: The tree induces an equivalence relation ∼ on S I defined by s ∼ s if and only if s and s induce the same outcome (among leaders), ∀ s s ∈ S I . For each follower i ∈ II let T i be a set with the same number of elements as the quotient space Z = S I / ∼ and let T = ؋ i∈II T i . Then λ assigns for each equivalence class z ∈ Z a probability distribution λ t z t∈T on T . Followers again observe their component of the vector t ∈ T and choose strategies simultaneously. In the payoff functions λ t s I replaces λ t s I , where s I denotes the equivalence class of s I ∈ S I . All other definitions can be adapted accordingly and the analysis would proceed along the same lines as for the present model.
ONE-SHOT EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES
The first result shows that if λ is completely uninformative, then G λ is "strategically equivalent" to , and if λ is perfectly informative, then G λ is "strategically equivalent" to G. Still, of course, the extensive form game G λ differs from G even in terms of the tree. The number of terminal nodes of G is S = S I S II , while the number of terminal nodes of G λ is S I II +1 S II , for all λ ∈ . Moreover, G has S I proper subgames, while G λ has no proper subgame. But the normal forms of G and G λ have the same strategy sets, i.e., they differ only by the payoff function. Proof. (a) Assume d λ = 1. Then, for any σ ∈ , straightforward calculations using Eqs. (3) and (4) show that ϕ = φ λ σ implies for any follower i ∈ II that φ for all s II ∈ S II and all s ∈ S I . Therefore, i∈N φ
This implies directly that σ is an equilibrium of G λ if and only if φ −1 φ λ σ is an equilibrium of . (b) If d λ = 0, then for each s ∈ S I the most likely vector of signals m λ s ∈ T projects one-to-one onto each T i and occurs with probability one given the leaders' strategy combination. Thus, one can replace the followers' strategy combinations in G by their compositions with m λ (a relabelling of strategies), so (the normal form of) G λ and G are the same game.
Of course, if d λ < 1 followers may correlate their strategies and, therefore, such a game G λ need not be "strategically equivalent" to (see Example 1 below). If signals are noisy, then in G λ all information sets t i ∈ T i are reached with positive probability for all followers i ∈ II. Therefore, any Nash equilibrium of G λ induces a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) of G λ , for any λ ∈ int . Sequential equilibria of G λ encompass beliefs for all followers. In the present model those are beliefs about the leaders' strategy combination and about the signals received by other followers. They are given by
for all s I t −i ∈ S I × T −i and for all information sets t i ∈ T i , whenever this quantity is defined, and arbitrary otherwise, ∀ i ∈ II. If signals are noisy, then the quantity in Eq. (5) is always defined.
Beliefs are governed, within the present model, by the signals which followers observe and by what leaders (are supposed to) do in equilibrium. At a Nash equilibrium every player behaves optimally given the strategy combination of the opponents. The latter information on the opponents' strategy combination represents a "prior" which followers update when they observe their signals. But if the "prior" is concentrated at a pure strategy combination of leaders, updating by Bayes' rule does not change the followers' beliefs about the leaders' strategy combination (though possibly about the signals received by other followers). This observation underlies the following proposition, which is conceptually different from Bagwell's (1995) , because it makes explicit the conditions for an equilibrium of G λ to induce an equilibrium outcome of . Let E resp. E G λ be the set of (possibly mixed) Nash equilibria of resp. G λ .
Proposition 2. For all noisy signals, i.e., ∀ λ ∈ int
, there exists a Nash equilibrium s I b ∈ E G λ at which leaders play pure, s I ∈ S I , and followers ignore signals, b t = b t , ∀ t t ∈ T , if and only if there exists a Nash equilibrium s I σ II ∈ E at which leaders play pure, s I ∈ S I , with the same outcome, φ λ s
Then for all leaders i ∈ I from Eq. (1)
From Eq. (5) for all i ∈ II beliefs at information sets t i ∈ T i are given by
From the "if" part of Proposition 2 every outcome of an equilibrium of the one-shot game at which leaders play pure, s I ∈ S I , remains an equilibrium outcome of G λ for all noisy signals. But the converse need, in general, not be true. There can be equilibria of G λ , for some λ ∈ int , at which leaders play pure, s I ∈ S I , which do not induce an equilibrium outcome of (nor a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of G). This may happen, because with sufficiently informative signals followers may use their observations to coordinate on different strategy combinations after different signals. This possibility is illustrated by the first example, showing that it is necessary for Proposition 2 for followers to ignore signals. In this example followers' behavior approximates a Nash equilibrium of G which is not subgame perfect.
Example 1. Consider the game given in Table I for some z ∈ 0 1 , where S i = s 1 i s 2 i , ∀ i ∈ N, and u = u 1 u 2 u 3 . To define G let I = 1 and II = 2 3 and let signal spaces be given by T i = 1 2 , ∀ i = 2 3.
For this example assume that signals are conditionally independent in the sense that λ t s 1 = λ 2 t 2 s 1 λ 3 t 3 s 1 , ∀ t s 1 ∈ T × S 1 . This assumption is adopted here to avoid that equilibria of G λ , for some λ ∈ int , at which leaders play pure fail to induce one-shot equilibrium outcomes merely because followers receive (conditionally) correlated signals and thus can correlate their strategies.
Abbreviate notation by λ i 1 s 2 1 = ε i , and b i s
Assume that there is some ε > 0 such that λ i t s 3−t 1 < ε, ∀ t = 1 2, for i = 2 3, i.e., the "wrong" signals occur with probability less than ε. Now consider the strategy combination s 2 1 x 2 x 3 given byx i1 = 1 andx
If signals are conditionally independent, payoffs can be written as for all i ∈ N and any strategy combination σ ∈ . Therefore, at the strategy combination s 2 1 x 2 x 3 one has 
Since every strategy is a best reply for followers, in particularx i is a best reply against s 2 1 x 2 x 3 , for all i ∈ II. Moreover, if ε is sufficiently small, then the leader i = 1 will obtain a payoff close to −2 from deviating to s 1 1 against x 2 x 3 , while she obtains precisely 0 from playing s it is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of G.
The example not withstanding, there are cases where an equilibrium of some G λ , with noisy signals, at which leaders play pure does indeed induce an equilibrium outcome of . One such case implies Bagwell's (1995) result in the following sense. Suppose G has a single follower, II = i , and this single follower has a unique optimal choice in every proper subgame of G. This is, for instance, the case in the two-player games with distinct payoffs studied by Bagwell (1995) and by van Damme and Hurkens (1997) . In such a case beliefs concern exclusively the leaders' strategy combination (and not also the signals of other followers). Therefore, if leaders play pure, s I ∈ S I , at some equilibrium of G λ , for λ ∈ int , the follower's beliefs at information set t i ∈ T i are µ i s I t i = 1 and µ i s t i = 0, ∀ s ∈ S I \ s I , for all t i ∈ T i . Hence, the follower must play her unique optimal choice from the subgame of G which starts after s I at all of her information sets. Consequently, the follower does not condition on signals and the "only if" part of Proposition 2 implies that the induced outcome is an equilibrium outcome of the one-shot game .
In other cases extra assumptions yield a coincidence of the pure strategy equilibrium outcomes of and some G λ with noisy signals. Below such a coincidence is demonstrated by combining generic payoffs with conditionally independent but sufficiently informative noisy signals. Recall from Example 1 that signals are conditionally independent if λ t s = i∈II λ i t i s , ∀ t s ∈ T × S I . Moreover, say that a statement holds for almost all games , or for generic , if there is an open dense set with full Lebesgue measure in the space of payoff assignments u = u i i∈N for which the statement is true. Proof. It is not difficult to show that for almost all games there exists some threshold γ ∈ 0 1 such that if φ σ s > 1 − γ, then every follower i ∈ II has a unique (and, therefore, pure) best reply against σ ∈ S , ∀ s ∈ S. Fix such a generic game and let γ ∈ 0 1 denote the associated threshold. Since d is continuous, for every δ ∈ 0 1 there is ε ∈ 0 1 such that if d λ < ε, then λ m λ s s > 1 − δ, ∀ s ∈ S I . Assume that (noisy) signals are conditionally independent and let ε ∈ 0 1 be so small that d λ < ε implies λ m λ s s > 1 − γ 1/ II , ∀ s ∈ S I . Now consider a pure strategy equilibrium of G λ at which leaders play s I ∈ S I , denote m λ s I = t * i i∈II , and let s II i ∈ S i denote the (pure) choice that follower i ∈ II takes at information set t * i ∈ T i , ∀ i ∈ II. A follower's beliefs are from Eq. (5) and conditional independence given by
Therefore, at all her information sets follower i ∈ II expects the strategy combination s I s II −i of her opponents to occur with probability larger than 1 − γ. Consequently, she will choose at all her information sets her unique (pure) best reply against s I s II ∈ S, which, by the equilibrium property, must be s II i ∈ S i . Since this holds for all followers, at the equilibrium b i s II i t i = 1, for all t i ∈ T i and all i ∈ II, i.e., followers ignore signals. Then the "only if" part of Proposition 2 implies that s I s II ∈ E . Conversely, if s I s II ∈ E , then the "if" part of Proposition 2 implies that this induces an equilibrium outcome for G λ , for all noisy signals.
Proposition 3 appears as the most direct generalization of Bagwell's (1995) result. It seems to indicate that pure subgame perfect equilibria of G do not survive the introduction of a small amount of noise in signals, unless they are equilibria of the one-shot game . But Proposition 3, like Bagwell's (1995) result, relies heavily on pure strategies.
ACCESSIBLE OUTCOMES
Van Damme and Hurkens (1997) have shown that for generic two-player games there is always a (mixed) equilibrium of G λ , for λ ∈ int , the outcome of which converges to the pure subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of G as d λ converges to zero. Such an approximation by (equilibrium) outcomes is the best one can hope for. Already for Bagwell's (1995) original example it can be shown that in strategy space no equilibrium of a game G λ with noisy signals is close to the (unique) subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of G. And this is a robust example. Even the approximation in outcomes, however, relies on generic payoffs, because if payoffs are degenerate, then the game without noise may have a multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria. Among those multiple equilibrium outcomes there may be no single outcome which is "accessible," even if there are only two players, as the following example shows.
Example 2. Let be given by the 2 × 2 game in Table II , where again
Define G by setting I = 1 and II = 2 and let the signal space be T = T 2 = 1 2 . The game G has a whole set of subgame perfect equilibria: The leader randomizes with probability σ 1 s 1 1 = σ 1 ∈ 0 1 on strategy s in the subgame starting after s 2 1 . Denoting b 2 s 1 2 t = x t , ∀ t ∈ T = 1 2 , and λ t s j 1 = λ tj , ∀ t j ∈ 1 2 2 , the follower's conditional payoff given signal t ∈ T is proportional to V λ 2 σ 1 x t t ∝ 2 x t σ 1 λ t1 + λ t2 − λ t2 + 2 1 − σ 1 λ t2 − σ 1 λ t1 (where "∝" means "proportional to"). For sufficiently informative signals, λ tj > 0, ∀ t j ∈ 1 2 2 , but λ tj ≈ 0, ∀ j = t, λ tt ≈ 1, ∀ t ∈ 1 2 , the follower's behavior in equilibrium thus satisfies
Denoting X j = t∈T λ tj x t , ∀ j ∈ T , the leader's payoff can be written as V λ 1 σ = σ 1 1 − X 1 − X 2 + X 2 Thus σ 1 = 1 implies x 1 = x 2 = 1, which in turn implies that σ 1 = 0 is the leader's unique best choice; similarly, σ 1 = 0 implies x 1 = x 2 = 0, which in turn implies that σ 1 = 1 is the leader's unique best choice. Therefore, in 1 0 0 2 equilibrium 0 < σ 1 < 1 implies X 1 + X 2 = 1. If now λ 11 + λ 12 > 1, then in equilibrium σ 1 = λ 12 / λ 11 + λ 12 ≈ 0. If, on the other hand, λ 11 + λ 12 < 1, then in equilibrium σ 1 = λ 22 / λ 21 + λ 22 ≈ 1. Note that the payoffs to the follower are different in the two cases and that in both cases the corresponding equilibria of G λ are unique. Consequently, no single equilibrium outcome of G is approximated by the (outcomes induced by) mixed equilibria of the games with informative but noisy signals.
But it turns out that generic payoffs are the only necessary condition for the result by van Damme and Hurkens (1997) to hold. While their proof for the existence of an "accessible" outcome relies on a single follower and on inequalities describing the (single) leader's optimal choice, the generalization below uses well-known results from game theory to establish an analogous conclusion for the general n-player case.
Formally, call an outcome ϕ ∈ S accessible if (i) there exists a subgame perfect (Selten, 1965 ) Nash equilibrium of G which induces ϕ ∈ S and (ii) for any sequence λ r ∞ r=1 which satisfies λ r ∈ int , ∀ r, and d λ r → r→∞ 0, there exists an associated sequence σ r ∞ r=1 with σ r ∈ E G λ r , ∀ r, such that φ λ r σ r → r→∞ ϕ ∈ S .
With this definition one can now state:
Theorem 1. For all partitions of the player set into leaders and followers and almost all games there exists an accessible outcome.
Proof. First observe that the number of terminal nodes of the extensive form game G equals the number of strategy combinations of the normal form game , i∈N S i . Hence, the mapping from to G for a fixed partition of the player set into leaders and followers is one-to-one and onto. Kreps and Wilson (1982) show that for a fixed extensive form there is, in the space of payoff assignments to terminal nodes, an open dense set with full Lebesgue measure such that for all payoffs in this set the number of equilibrium outcomes is finite.
3 It follows that for such generic payoffs the outcome is constant across each of the finitely many connected components of the set of Nash equilibria of the associated normal form (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986 , Proposition 1). Hence, for any fixed partition of the player set into leaders and followers, there is a generic set of payoff assignments to G and, therefore, a generic set of normal form games such that the outcome is constant across each of the finitely many connected components of the set of equilibria of G .
Moreover, every game has an essential component 4 (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, Proposition 1; Ritzberger, 1994 , Theorem 4) which contains a hyperstable set (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, p. 1022 ) by Zorn's lemma (cf. van Damme, 1987, p. 266) . Every hyperstable set contains a proper equilibrium (Myerson, 1978; Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, Proposition 3) . Since every proper equilibrium induces a sequential equilibrium in any extensive form corresponding to the given normal form (van Damme, 1984; Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, p. 1009) , among the outcomes associated with an essential component there is at least one that corresponds to a sequential equilibrium of any associated extensive form game.
For perfectly informative signals, d λ = 0, the normal form of G λ and the normal form G are identical up to a relabelling of the followers' strategies by Proposition 1(b). Let C be an essential component of Nash equilibria for G . If is generic in the sense described above, there is a single outcome corresponding to C which is induced by some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of G, because C contains a proper equilibrium. But since C is essential, every (normal form of a) game G λ with λ ∈ int such that d λ is sufficiently small has a Nash equilibrium close to C, because d is continuous. Since from Eq. (3) the mapping λ σ → φ λ σ is continuous, the outcomes induced by those Nash equilibria of (the normal form of) G λ close to C must be close to the outcome induced by (all equilibria in) C.
The technique of this proof relying on set-valued solution concepts may be suggestive of a set-valued generalization of accessibility. After all, in the game from Example 2 there at least exists a closed (and connected) set of outcomes that satisfies the definition of accessibility as a set.
5 While it seems possible that the existence of such a set-valued generalization of accessibility may hold for all two-player games, the next example shows that this is false in the general case where payoffs may be degenerate.
What happens in the example below is that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of G are induced by a (small) part of a connected component of Nash equilibria, the latter being an essential component. The degeneracy of the example rests with the fact that outcomes vary across the essential component. By choosing a particular signal distribution for G λ one chooses effectively a particular payoff perturbation of G . The equilibria of the latter may lie anywhere close to the essential component of G , not necessarily close to the equilibria that induce subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of G.
Example 3. Let be the four-player game in Table III , where again
. Define G by letting players 1 and 2 be the leaders, I = 1 2 , and players 3 and 4 be the followers, II = 3 4 . Since the spirit of this example is negative as far as subgame perfection is concerned, we wish to avoid a failure of accessibility merely because of a lack of correlation between the followers' signals. Therefore, we assume for this example that followers receive perfectly correlated signals, i.e., all followers observe the same signal (as they do in G). Formally, T 3 = T 4 = 1 2 3 4 and supp λ ⊂ diag T = t ∈ T t 3 = t 4 . To save on notation, write t ∈ 1 2 3 4 for t 3 t 4 = t t ∈ diag T and λ t s for λ t 3 t 4 s , whenever t 3 = t 4 = t, ∀ s ∈ S I . Of course, signals are still noisy, λ ∈ int , as long as supp λ = diag T .
The game G thus defined has a few features of extensive form interaction. In particular, in the subgame starting after s . This set is part of a larger connected component of Nash equilibria of G. Denote b 3 s 1 3 t = x t and b 4 s 1 4 t = y t , ∀ t ∈ 1 2 3 4 , σ 1 s 1 1 = σ 1 and σ 2 s 1 2 = σ 2 , and λ t s k 1 s h 2 = λ t 2k+h−2 , ∀ k h ∈ 1 2 . The followers' conditional payoffs given signal t are proportional to
Inspection of these conditional payoffs reveals that against any strategy combination of the leaders which happens to satisfy σ 1 σ 2 ∈ 0 1 2 , except if σ 1 = 1, followers play a game with a unique completely mixed equilibrium. If σ 1 = 1 and σ 2 > 0, then x t = 0 and y t ∈ 0 1 holds in equilibrium. In any case σ 1 σ 2 ∈ 0 1 2 , therefore, implies in equilibrium
Denoting X j = t∈T λ tj x t , ∀ j = 1 4, the leaders' payoffs can be written as
If in equilibrium σ 1 > 0 and X 4 ≤ 1 16 hold, then σ 2 = 1 is the only optimal choice for player 2, which would imply x t < 1 3 holds, then σ 1 = 1 is player 1's unique best choice, which implies that σ 2 = 1 is player 2's unique best choice, which in turn implies x t = 0, ∀ t = 1 4 -again a contradiction. Thus in all equilibria with σ 1 σ 2 ∈ 0 1 2 one must have X 3 < 1 3
and X 4 > 1 16
. But this implies, from the leaders' payoffs, that leaders are also playing a game with a unique completely mixed equilibrium.
Finally, if σ 2 = 0, then followers in equilibrium must play x t = 1 and y t ∈ 0 1 , ∀ t = 1 4, implying that σ 1 = 1 is the unique best choice for player 1 and, therefore, σ 2 = 1 is player 2's unique best choice, contradicting the assumption σ 2 = 0. Similarly, σ 1 = 0 in equilibrium implies x t ≥ 1 6 , ∀ t = 1 4, and, therefore, X j ≥ 1 6
, ∀ j = 1 4, which implies from 1 − 2 σ 2 1 − 3 X 3 ≥ 1 − σ 2 that σ 2 = 1 if σ 1 = 0 is an optimal choice; but at σ 1 = 0 one has that 1 − 16 X 4 ≤ − 5 3 implies σ 2 = 0, a contradiction. It follows that all equilibria of the games G λ with noisy signals have a completely mixed equilibrium with respect to leaders. All equilibria must, therefore, be solutions to the following system of six equations:
The equation for σ 1 implies that in any equilibrium σ 1 ≤ 3 4
. Now consider the signal distribution (for signals in the support of λ)
with ε > 0 sufficiently small. With this λ the solutions to the above six equations can be regarded as functions of ε. For the outcome induced by a sequence σ 1 ε σ 2 ε x t ε t∈T ε 0 to converge to an outcome supported by a subgame perfect equilibrium of G it is necessary that σ 1 0 = 3 4
and σ 2 0 = 1. Clearly,
holds, where σ i = σ i ε , ∀ i ∈ I. But the limit of x 4 ε as ε 0 is indeterminate. Now observe that the reduced system of (the three) equations for x 3 σ 1 σ 2 at fixed values x 1 x 2 x 4 = x 1 x 2 x 4 ∈ 0 1 3 has a nonsingular Jacobian matrix with determinant 72 1 − σ 1 0 1 − 4x 4 4x 3 0 − 1 = −24 1 − σ 1 0 1 − 4x 4 = 0 at ε = 0, wheneverx 4 = 1 4
, and, therefore, has a non-singular Jacobian matrix at all sufficiently small ε > 0 if
. Hence, one can invoke l'Hospital's rule to determine the limit of x 4 ε as ε 0. So again with σ i = σ i ε , ∀ i ∈ I:
Since the derivative at ε = 0 of σ 2 ε is given by σ 2 0 = 6 x 3 0 and x 3 0 = −σ 1 0 / 6 1 − σ 1 0 , this yields
But then from the equation for σ 1 ε it follows that
Since this violates σ 1 0 = 3 4
, the only equilibrium of G λ with the above noise structure does not induce an outcome close to any of the outcomes supported by subgame perfect equilibria of G.
In fact, the unique equilibrium of G λ with the above noise structure does not even induce payoffs close to some subgame perfect equilibrium payoff. As ε approaches zero, the payoff to follower i = 4 approaches 15 24
, which exceeds the highest payoff to follower 4 in any of the subgame perfect equilibria of G.
Finally, we turn to the question whether all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of G for a generic game might be accessible. The example below shows that this is not the case, even if there is only a single leader in G. The reason is that not all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of games with several followers (and perfect observability) must be induced by (equilibria in) an essential component of the associated normal form game. This shows that Theorem 1 is an existence theorem in a strict sense. is accessible and λ j jj ≈ 1, ∀ j = 1 2, then certainly σ > 0 and x 1 = y 1 = 1 must hold for all λ ∈ int with d λ sufficiently small. If σ = 1, then x 1 = x 2 = y 1 = y 2 = 1 implies a payoff of 1 − σ /6 for the leader which is maximal for σ = 0. Hence, 0 < σ < 1 must hold.
At σ ∈ 0 1 and x 1 = y 1 = 1 the equilibrium values of x 2 y 2 for z 2 λ > z 3 λ are as follows: If σ > z 2 λ , then x 2 y 2 = 1 1 ; if σ = z 2 λ , then x 2 y 2 ∈ 0 1 × 1 ; if z 2 λ > σ > z 3 λ , then x 2 y 2 = 0 1 ; if σ = z 3 λ , then x 2 y 2 = 0 1 or x 2 y 2 ∈ 1 × 0 ȳ z 3 λ λ ; and, finally, if z 3 λ > σ, then x 2 y 2 = 0 1 , or x 2 y 2 = 1 0 , or x 2 y 2 = x σ λ ȳ σ λ . In any case, y 2 < 1 implies y 2 ≤ȳ z 3 λ λ , becauseȳ is an increasing function of σ. Under the assumption 3λ The leader's payoff in G λ is given by
x h y k − 1 taking into account that h k ∈T λ j hk = 1, ∀ j = 1 2. As noted earlier, if s which is inconsistent with y 2 ∈ 0 7/16 ∪ 1 if λ j jj is sufficiently close to 1, ∀ j = 1 2. It follows that for arbitrarily small noise in the signals there is no equilibrium with an outcome close to s One might ask what the properties of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are that make them accessible or not accessible. A partial answer can be deduced from the proof of Theorem 1 and Example 4. The proof of Theorem 1 rests on the existence of an essential component of Nash equilibria for the normal form G . The accessible outcome in Example 4 is induced by the equilibria in the essential component, while the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of G in Example 4 which is not accessible is induced by the equilibria in a component which is not essential. So accessibility in general seems to be driven by essential components for the normal form G and not by any extensive form considerations. That the normal form games associated with games G λ are indeed payoff perturbations of G can be seen from Eq. (1). This also suggests why accessibility takes us outside the framework considered by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) . First, for the original definition of strategically stable sets it is trivial that such sets for G may not induce an accessible outcome (unless they coincide with hyperstable sets), because strategically stable sets need not induce sequential equilibrium outcomes for an associated extensive form (see the example by Faruk Gul in Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, Fig. 11 ). Second, one could take limits, as noisy signals become more and more informative, of (outcomes induced by) strategically stable sets for (the normal form of) G λ . Van Damme and Hurkens (1997) , by employing an equilibrium selection theory, provide a successful example of an approach in that spirit which, however, goes beyond strategic stability. For more standard refinement concepts, like strategic stability, even Bagwell's (1995) example serves to show that this procedure may generate all Nash equilibrium outcomes of G, not just those that are subgame perfect in G.
Strategically stable sets are set-valued versions of strict perfection (Okada, 1981) and thus rely on strategy perturbations. Strategy perturbations indeed correspond to specific payoff perturbations, but are more special than the latter. In particular, strategy perturbations need not correspond to the payoff perturbations generated by introducing noisy signals into G. But it is the robustness against the payoff perturbations generated by noisy signals which underlies accessibility. And strategy perturbations may not cover such payoff perturbations.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that in general n-player games imperfect observability of earlier moves in an extensive form game need not necessarily eliminate a precommitment effect: For almost all games there is an accessible outcome, independently of how the player set is split into leaders and followers. But this conclusion does depend on generic payoffs. Moreover, the main theorem of this paper is strictly an existence result in the sense that not all subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the unperturbed game may qualify as accessible. The latter is due to the fact that some subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of the game with perfect observability may not be robust to the payoff perturbations introduced by noisy signals.
